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Image scoring sustains cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner’s dilemma through indirect reci-
procity, even though defection is the uniquely dominant selfish behaviour in the one-shot game. Many real-
world dilemma situations, however, firstly, take place in groups and, secondly, lack the necessary transparency
to inform subjects reliably of others’ individual past actions. Instead, there is revelation of information regarding
groups, which allows for ‘group scoring’ but not for image scoring. Here, we study how sensitive the positive
results related to image scoring are to information based on group scoring. We combine analytic results and
computer simulations to specify the conditions for the emergence of cooperation. We show that under pure
group scoring, that is, under the complete absence of image-scoring information, cooperation is unsustainable.
Away from this extreme case, however, the necessary degree of image scoring relative to group scoring de-
pends on the population size and is generally very small. We thus conclude that the positive results based on
image scoring apply to a much broader range of informational settings that are relevant in the real world than
previously assumed.
Public goods provision [1, 2], common-pool resource man-
agement [3], and other social dilemma situations often require
large groups of individuals to make individually costly contri-
butions toward a collective action, i.e., to cooperate [4]. With-
out sufficient consideration of future consequences, however,
many real-world interactions lack the necessary cooperative-
ness to prevent misalignment of private and social interests.
This leads to socially undesirable outcomes. The result may
be irrevocable mismanagement and over-exhaustion of shared
resources, ultimately resulting in the ‘tragedy of the com-
mons’ [3, 5, 6], which is a long-term outcome that is worse
for everyone.
Hence, the ‘puzzle of cooperation’ [7–11]. Why do certain
social interactions flourish with high levels of foresight and
cooperation, while others are impeded by short-sighted free-
riding behaviour? Game theory [12, 13] provides the neces-
sary theoretical framework for studying the individual-level
motivations [14] to answer this question. Indeed, game the-
ory provides many answers, including a variety of evolution-
ary [15, 16] and psychological [17–19] explanations, but only
two based, in the language of game theory, on ‘rationality’.
One of these two rational explanations is based on fore-
sightedness. Namely, if individuals take future consequences
sufficiently into account, then equilibria exist supported by
more sophisticated, repeated-game strategies that overcome
the short-term incentives to free-ride [20]. Unfortunately,
to uphold cooperation that way, individuals would need to
commit to strategies in ways that may produce grim conse-
quences if not everyone follows the strategy equilibrium path
[21]. Hence, groups consisting of sufficiently foresighted
agents may succeed to guarantee provision of a common,
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while groups with too many short-sighted or boundedly ra-
tional agents will fail. The second rational explanation of
the puzzle of cooperation is based on building a reputation
from the past [22]. Essentially, players build a commitment-
to-cooperation reputation through their past actions, and find
each other, thus, outperforming defectors (who are stuck with
other defectors), even though defection is the uniquely domi-
nant selfish behaviour in the one-shot game [14]. As a result,
if reputation matters sufficiently in determining with whom
individuals interact, then cooperation can survive despite lim-
ited foresight.
Unfortunately, due to the inherent simultaneity of interac-
tions [23], it is impossible to condition one’s own decision on
the decisions of the others [14]. One of the most important,
and perhaps the simplest, reputation mechanism known in the
literature to overcome this problem is image scoring [24]. Fa-
mously, image scoring can sustain cooperation in the repeated
two-player prisoner’s dilemma through various forms of indi-
rect reciprocity [25–27]. Under image scoring, agents learn
who cooperated and who defected in previous interactions,
and consequently condition their own actions on this informa-
tion. Essentially, image scoring enables cooperators to find
each other, and this overcomes the negative Nash equilibrium
prediction of universal defection from the one-shot game. In-
terestingly, image scoring has been shown to work in the lab-
oratory [28–32], but in general, it is considered to provide a
relatively frail support to cooperative behaviour [33, 34].
In fact, many real-world social dilemmas unfold in groups
[35], and it is unlikely that individuals will have access to oth-
ers’ individual action histories [1, 2]. Information that should
be readily available, however, concerns the performance of
the groups as a whole. Such information thus enables ‘group
scoring’ as an alternative to image scoring. In particular, the
image of an individual is no longer determined by its own past
action, but by the performance of the group where an individ-
2ual is member. More precisely, each player’s group score sum-
marizes the aggregate cooperativeness of the groups where he
was a member in the past, without any additional information
regarding what the player did individually. Two important
and previously unaddressed new questions emerge: (i) How
do results related to image scoring generalize to group scor-
ing?, and (ii) How sensitive are these results to information,
that is, when image scoring constitutes a proportion p ∈ [0, 1]
of information made available and the residual information is
based on group scoring?
The common feature of previous research on image scor-
ing is that, over time, cooperators achieve higher scores and
defectors achieve lower scores, and interactions are matched
based on these scores such that thus cooperators play with co-
operators and defectors play with defectors. In our paper, we
build on this common feature by assuming the existence of a
mechanism that assorts and matches players by their scores.
In addition, we extent the scope of image-scoring-based mod-
els by analysing the sensitivity of the results to the imperfec-
tions of scores that ought to reflect individuals’ true past coop-
erativeness rather than the overall performance of the groups
where they are members. Our analysis continuously spans the
worlds of two extremes; image scoring and group scoring. As
we will show, image scoring, reflecting accurately individu-
als’ past actions, works perfectly also in the generalized pris-
oner’s dilemma game that is governed by group interaction.
Conversely, group scoring fails, as it enables defectors to ef-
fectively hide behind the cooperative efforts of others in the
group. But how many true images are needed for cooperation
to evolve in group interaction? In other words, what is the
necessary proportion p ∈ (0, 1) of image scoring? It turns out
that this depends sensitively on the underlying parameters of
the interactions in ways that provide a formal basis for some
of Ostrom’s conditions for successful common-pool resource
management [3]. Key determinants are the rate of return, the
size of the population, and the group size. Remarkably, for
large populations only a ‘grain’ of image scoring is generally
sufficient for cooperation to become dominant.
Results
We shall now formalize our arguments, generalizing step by
step the two-by-two prisoner’s dilemma model due to [24] to
the more general context of the voluntary contributions game
[1, 2]. Suppose a population N = {1, 2, ..., n} plays the
following game in rounds t = {1, 2, ...,∞}. Each player
i ∈ N , in period t, chooses a contribution cti from budget
B = {0, 1}. At the same time, each player i is associated
with a binary score sti = {0, 1}, and players are matched
into k groups S = {S1, ..., Sk} of a fixed size s = n/k ac-
cording to the ranking of players’ scores (with random tie-
breaking). After groups have formed, i’s resulting payoff
turns out φti(c) = (1 − c
t
i) + r/s ∗
∑
j∈St
i
ctj , where Sti is
i’s group. r is the game’s fixed rate of return, and r/s the
game’s ‘marginal per-capita rate of return’ that summarizes
the underlying game’s synergy. We assume, as is standard,
r ∈ [1, s], that is, contributing a unit of budget is socially
beneficial (yielding a sum total of payoffs to all players larger
than one), but individually costly.
We consider the following range of scoring mechanisms be-
tween image scoring and group scoring.
Image scoring: First, we formulate the equivalent of image
scoring [24] in our setup: at time t each player i has an
image score, stIi, known to every player which is based
on decisions prior to t. In period t + 1, if i’s period-t
contribution cti exceeded the average contribution ct =∑
i∈N c
t
i/n at time t, then his image score is one; if
cti < c
t then it is zero. Finally, if cti = ct, then s
t+1
i =
sti.
Group scoring: Analogously, we formulate group scoring:
at time t each player i has a group score, stGi. Sup-
pose i’s period-t group is S. If the contribution in S,
ctS =
∑
i∈S c
t
i, exceeded the average group contribu-
tion overall, ctS =
∑
S∈St c
t
S/k, then i’s period-(t+ 1)
group score is one; if ctS < ctS then it is zero. Finally, if
ctS = c
t
S , then st+1i = sti.
Hybrid scoring: A hybrid between image scoring and group
scoring in our setup means that, at time t, each player i
has a hybrid score, stHi, known to every player which is
based on decisions prior to t. In period t+1, if i’s score
is updated according to image scoring with probability
p, and according to group scoring with probability 1−p.
To summarize the three scoring methods, the types of in-
formation necessary under the different regimes are as fol-
lows. For image scoring, ex post individual-level information
about contribution decisions is necessary, group-level infor-
mation is therefore trivially also available. For group scor-
ing, group associations and ex post group-level contributions
need be known, individual-level information is not necessary.
For the hybrid case, characterized by degree of image scoring
p ∈ [0, 1], the probability that individual-level information
rather than only group-level information becomes available
must be larger than zero.
The stability of cooperation under the different scoring
rules can be evaluated. One result is that tragedy of the com-
mons (resulting from universal defection) is a potential risk in
all cases. The stability of universal defection under all scoring
rules derives from the fact that unilateral defection is a best
response under all scoring methods against a state of univer-
sal defection. However, the relative stability of this worst-case
outcome vis-a-vis a highly cooperative state critically depends
on the scoring rule, mitigating this issue.
Under image scoring, high levels of cooperation can be sta-
bilized and then turn out to be more stable. This is the case
if the proportion of cooperators with score one (matched in
good groups) grows exactly at the speed so as to neutralize
the shrinking of the proportion of cooperators with score zero
(matched in bad groups). The defectors profit from the con-
tributions of the latter group and achieve an average growth
equal to that of the average cooperator.
Stability is summarized with the results presented in Fig. 1
from simulations. The Methods section contains analytical
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FIG. 1: Under image scoring cooperators always rise to complete
dominance. Shown is the fraction of cooperators in dependence on
the number of iterations. The inset shows the corresponding fraction
of defectors on a semi-logarithmic scale to highlight their exponen-
tial decay. Depicted results are averaged over 200 independent re-
alizations to minimize fluctuations. Parameter values are: s = 5,
n = 1500 and r = 4.
proof of these results, as well as a description of the employed
Monte Carlo simulation procedure. It can be observed that the
state of complete cooperation is reached exponentially fast.
We emphasize that this result is recovered independently of
the value of s, r and n, and it is also robust against variations
of the strategy adoption rule. Cooperation will always prevail
under image scoring, as it allows cooperators to separate from
defectors. In general, cooperators form homogeneous groups
that provide them with a competitive payoff. Conversely, de-
fectors must be content to form groups with their like, which
provides them a null payoff. Cooperators can therefore eas-
ily invade defectors, and they do so with a speed that is pro-
portional to their number, which ultimately gives rise to the
exponentially fast downfall of defectors.
At first sight, such a state of cooperation may also seem
a candidate for stability under group scoring. Inspection of
the individual growth dynamics, however, reveals one cru-
cial difference. Namely, cooperation states are not robust
against the influx of defectors with score one. These play-
ers outperform all others, which, jointly with the fact that
score-zero defectors outperform score-zero cooperators, im-
plies an above-average growth rate for defection vis-a-vis co-
operation. In other words, the key difference between image
scoring and group scoring is that defectors can only free-ride
on the contributions of others under image scoring, while, un-
der group scoring, defectors can free-ride on the contributions
and scores of others.
Figure 2 mirrors the set-up of Fig. 1 in terms of the simula-
tion procedure, only that here group scoring instead of image
scoring is used. It can be observed that, irrespective of the
initial fraction of cooperators, they eventually die out. As by
image scoring, this outcome too is robust against variations
of s, r, n and the strategy adoption rule. Group scoring al-
lows defectors to have the same high score as cooperators,
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FIG. 2: Under group scoring cooperators always die out. Shown is
the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the number of iterations
for two different initial fractions (see legend). Depicted results are
averaged over 200 independent realizations to minimize fluctuations.
Parameter values are the same as in Fig. 1.
which in turn disables the separation of the two strategies into
homogeneous groups. In agreement with the outcome of the
public goods game in a well-mixed population, even a single
defector can therefore eventually invade the entire population.
Groups scoring thus completely fails to mitigate the tragedy
of the commons.
Since image scoring and group scoring could not be more
different in their ability to stabilize cooperation, it remains of
interest to determine the merit of hybrid scoring. While it
seems reasonable to assume that sometimes the information
about the past of each particular individual is readily avail-
able, more often that not the scoring of an individual is pos-
sible only indirectly through the achievements of the groups
where s/he was member. We note that individual contributions
in group efforts are notoriously difficult to pinpoint, which is
also why the reciprocation to such efforts is quite a vague con-
cept – if a group contains a cooperator and a defector, who
do you reciprocate with [36]? The question thus is, just how
much individual-level information is needed to stabilize coop-
eration? To answer this question, we introduce the probability
p that a player’s score is determined by image scoring, while
otherwise, with probability 1 − p, group scoring is used. All
other simulation details remain the same as in Figs. 1 and 2.
Results presented in Fig. 3 show that cooperation can
evolve even at a very small p value, if only the population size
is sufficiently large. The key for the stability of cooperation
is for cooperators being able to recognize each other through
their high scores, and thus to form homogeneous groups. The
lower the value of p and the lower the value of r, the longer
it takes for cooperators to segregate from defectors. Since co-
operators are threatened by extinction, it is imperative that the
segregation occurs before defectors take over. Accordingly,
the lower the value of p and r, the larger the population size
needs to be to warrant sufficient time to cooperators to segre-
gate before they die out. A lower bound for p is p ≥ 2/n. Re-
sults presented in Fig. 4 make these arguments quantitatively
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FIG. 3: Under hybrid scoring, even a minute probability for access-
ing the image score of an individual player suffices to stabilize coop-
eration. However, the size of the population is crucial, as the segre-
gation of cooperators from defectors takes the longer the smaller the
value of p. Thus, if the population size is too small, cooperators are
likely to die out before segregating into homogeneous groups. Seg-
regation is also decelerated by low values r (see Fig. 4 for details).
Shown is the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the number
of iterations, as obtained for different numbers of groups forming the
population (indicated alongside the lines). Depicted results are aver-
aged over 50−200 independent realizations to minimize fluctuations.
Parameter values are: p = 0.01, s = 5 and r = 1.1.
more accurate. Evidently, the lower the population size, the
higher the values of p and r need to be for cooperation to pre-
vail. In small populations, there exist critical threshold values
for both r (main panel) and r (inset), where drops to defector
dominance are abrupt and occurring without precursors.
We emphasize that the results concerning hybrid scoring
mechanisms are independent of the group size as long as their
number, and hence the population size, is sufficiently large,
and they are also independent of the strategy adoption rule.
This corroborates our main argument, which is that, regard-
less of the scoring that is used, conditions need to be given
for cooperators to completely segregate from defectors, i.e.,
to form homogeneous groups without a single defector. The
identification of defectors has second-order importance. The
key goal of scoring is thus to allow cooperators to recognize
each other efficiently and to form homogenous groups accord-
ingly.
Discussion
“The most important unanswered question in evolutionary
biology, and more generally in the social sciences, is how co-
operative behaviour evolved and can be maintained in human
or other animal groups and societies” (Robert May in his Pres-
idential Address to the Royal Society in 2005). A seminal ex-
planation for the puzzle of cooperation is based on image scor-
ing [24], a mechanism that is both stunningly successful and
stunningly simple. However, in its original formulation and
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FIG. 4: Hybrid scoring requires a critical population size to stabilize
cooperation under adverse conditions. Cooperators essentially com-
pete to segregate from defectors before being completely wiped out.
The lower the value of r (main panel) and p (inset), the larger the
population size needed for cooperation to be stabilized. Note that for
a sufficiently small population size (see legend), there exist sudden
drops to zero cooperation levels at critical values of r and p. Shown
is the stationary fraction of cooperators in dependence on r (main)
and p (inset), as obtained for different numbers of groups forming
the population (see legend). Parameter values are: p = 0.01 (main)
and r = 1.1 (inset).
application [24], it came with the restriction to interactions
that are pairwise to informational environments that allow a
complete tracking of individual-level information.
In the real world, these restrictive assumptions may not be
germane. Instead, cooperation may involve several groups
of individuals, and ex post information regarding individual-
level cooperativeness may only percolate imperfectly through
group-level information. Our focus in this paper has been to
determine robust theoretical predictions regarding the emer-
gence and survival of cooperation in such situations. The
presented results have rather important implications. One is
negative. Namely, when individual-level information is not
available, cooperation cannot spread. But there is a silver lin-
ing. When there is at least a ‘grain’ of individual-level in-
formation, this may suffice for cooperators to find each other
and form groups that are impervious to an invasion by defec-
tors. We have shown that the spread of cooperation is robust
to extensive imperfections in image scoring, thus extending
the domain of environments where we should expect flourish-
ing cooperation levels based on this established mechanism
that fosters indirect reciprocity. Factors that affect the effec-
tiveness of hybrid scoring negatively and positively are group
size and population size, respectively. The rate of return was
shown to not matter.
There is one important component that the model we con-
sidered here externalises, namely the issue of how a hierarchy
of scores translates into an analogous group formation hierar-
chy. These are questions future work should address. In par-
ticular, we need to address how mechanisms known to play
such a role in the context of image scoring would translate
5into the informational setting considered here, and how such
mechanisms may be designed. Little is known in this direc-
tion. Economic experiments [37, 38] might be particularly
conductive to such research and guide future theoretical work
to relevantly address these fundamental dilemmas of human
cooperation.
Methods
Simulation procedure
The employed Monte Carlo simulation procedure [39] re-
quires the iteration of the following three elementary steps.
First, two randomly selected players i and j play one instance
of the public goods game in their current group, thereby ob-
taining payoffs φi and φj , respectively. Next, player j adopts
the strategy of player i with the probability given by the Fermi
function W = 1/{1 + exp[(φj − φi)/K]}, where K = 0.1
quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [40]. Each full
Monte Carlo step gives a chance for every player to change its
strategy once on average. The reported fractions of coopera-
tors and defectors were determined in the stationary state.
Stability analysis
At a given time t, there are four action-score pairs:
cooperate-one (cti = sti = 1), defect-one (cti = 0 and
sti = 1), cooperate-zero (cti = 1 and sti = 0), and defect-zero
(cti = sti = 0). Suppose players are hardwired to play either
action. However, scores change. Depending on the scoring
mechanism, the action vector c in period-t implies a score (or
a probability distribution of scores) for period t+ 1. Assume
that in some period all four action-score pairs are represented
by positive population proportions, pC1, pD1, pC0, pD0. Write
pC , pD for the proportions of cooperators and defectors. Sup-
pose the action proportions grow/ shrink, for action a =
{C,D}, given by a replicator equation similar to that in the
standard form: ∂pa/∂t = pta1 ∗ (pia1 − pi) + pta0 ∗ (pia0 − pi),
where pias is the expected payoff to action-score pair as and
pi is the average population payoff.
Stability of unconditional defection under all scoring rules
Suppose all players j in period t, independent of their score,
defect except for one player i who plays cti = 1. W.l.o.g.,
suppose sti = 1. No matter what i’s score, the payoff to i
representing pC1 is piC1 = r/s < 1, while the average payoff
is pi = 1 + s−1n−1 (r/s) > 0. Hence, ∂pC/∂t < 0 and therefore
any such process is stable at pC = 0.
Stability of high cooperation levels under image scoring
Suppose the four different strategies at time t have mass of
pC1, pD1, pC0, pD0 respectively such that pD1 = 0. We shall
now show that there exists a starting state with pC > (s−1)/s
such that ∂pC/∂t = 0. Suppose that pC1 = (n− s)/n. Then
piC1 = r, piC0 = (s − n ∗ pD0) ∗ (r/s) and piD0 = 1 +
(s − n ∗ pD0) ∗ (r/s). ∂pC/∂t = 0 if n−sn ∗ r +
s−n∗pD0
n ∗
(s − n ∗ pD0) ∗ (r/s) = pD0 ∗ (1 + (s − n ∗ pD0) ∗ (r/s)).
This yields pDO = 1/(1 − r + n ∗ (r/s)). Hence, a high
cooperation level of pC = n∗(r/s)−r1−r+n∗(r/s) is stable if pC1 =
(n− s)/n, pD1 = 0, pC0 = (s/n)− 1/(1− r + n ∗ (r/s)),
and pDO = 1/(1− r + n ∗ (r/s)). Notice that the temporary
growth in pC1 relative to pC0 is compensated by the score
dynamics which imply that exactly the proportion by which
pC0 will be replaced by the growth in pC1. Notice also that
these proportions are robust to a small increase in pD1 = 0 as
the overproportional growth ofD1 will result in scores of zero
in the next period (allD1s will turnD0 in the next round), and
then lead to a shrinking of D0.
Instability of high cooperation levels under group scoring
At first sight, the state with pC1 = (n − s)/n, pD1 = 0,
pC0 = (s/n) − 1/(1 − r + n ∗ (r/s)), and pDO = 1/(1 −
r+n ∗ (r/s)) could be stable. Indeed, provided that pD1 = 0
this state is stable against growth of proportions pC1, pC0 and
pDO. However, any small increase in pD1 destabilizes the
whole system. This is because, given pC1, pC0 and pDO, the
non-zero proportion pD1 not only grows overproportional, but
also – and this is the key difference with image scoring– is
likely to keep a score of one, and will therefore also not shrink
in the next period. Hence, the growth of C1 slows down while
D1 keeps growing. There can be no stable state with a positive
proportion pD1 as both pD1 and pD0 would continue to grow
faster than their cooperation counterparts.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the European Commission
through the ERC Advanced Investigator Grant ‘Momentum’
(Grant 324247), by the Deanship of Scientific Research, King
Abdulaziz University (Grant 76-130-35-HiCi), by the Slove-
nian Research Agency (Grant P5-0027), and by the Hungarian
National Research Fund (Grant K-101490).
[1] Isaac, M. R., McCue, K. F., and Plott, C. R. Public goods provi-
sion in an experimental environment. J. Public Econ. 26, 51–74
(1985).
[2] Isaac, M. and Walker, J. Group size effects in public goods
6provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism. Q. J. Econ.
103, 179–199 (1988).
[3] Ostrom, E. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institu-
tions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1990).
[4] Olson, M. The logic of collective action (Harvard University
Press, Harvard, 1965).
[5] Hardin, G. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162, 1243–
1248 (1968).
[6] Ostrom, E. Coping with tragedies of the commons. Annu. Rev.
Polit. Sci. 2, 493–535 (1999).
[7] Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New
York, 1984).
[8] Hammerstein, P., editor. Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Co-
operation (MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003).
[9] Henrich, J. and Henrich, N. Culture, evolution and the puzzle
of human cooperation. Cog. Sys. Res. 7, 220–245 (2006).
[10] Rand, D. A. and Nowak, M. A. Human cooperation. Trends
Cog. Sci. 17, 413–425 (2013).
[11] Nowak, M. A. and Highfield, R. SuperCooperators: Altruism,
Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed (Free
Press, New York, 2011).
[12] von Neumann, J. Zur theorie der gesellschaftsspiele. Mathema-
tische Annalen 100, 295–320 (1928). English Translation Fin
Tucker, A. W. and R. D. Luce, ed., Contributions to the Theory
of Games IV, Annals of Mathematics Studies 40, 1959.
[13] von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. Theory of Games and
Economic Behaviour (Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1944).
[14] Nash, J. Non-cooperative games. Ann. Math. 54, 286–295
(1951).
[15] Nowak, M. A. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Sci-
ence 314, 1560–1563 (2006).
[16] West, S. A., El Mouden, C., and Gardner, A. Sixteen common
misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans.
Evol. Human Behav. 32, 231–262 (2011).
[17] Fehr, E. and Ga¨chter, S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Na-
ture 415, 137–140 (2002).
[18] Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. The nature of human altruism.
Nature 425, 785–791 (2003).
[19] Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. A Cooperative Species: Human Reci-
procity and Its Evolution (Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, 2011).
[20] Friedman, J. W. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames.
Rev. Econ. Stud. 38, 1–12 (1971).
[21] Rubinstein, A. Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking
criterion. J. Econ. Theor. 21, 1–9 (1979).
[22] Kreps, D. M. and Wilson, R. Sequential Equilibria. Economet-
rica 50, 863–894, July (1982).
[23] Andreoni, J. Why free ride? strategies and learning in public
goods experiments. J. Public Econ. 37, 291–304 (1988).
[24] Nowak, M. A. and Sigmund, K. Evolution of indirect reci-
procity by image scoring. Nature 393, 573–577 (1998).
[25] Trivers, R. L. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol.
46, 35–57 (1971).
[26] Sugden, R. The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare
(Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986).
[27] Alexander, R. D. The Biology of Moral Systems (Aldinee de
Gruyter, New York, 1987).
[28] Wedekind, C. and Milinski, M. Cooperation through image
scoring in humans. Science 288, 850–852 (2000).
[29] Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Bakker, T. C. M., and Krambeck,
H.-J. Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring
or standing strategy? Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 268, 2495–2501
(2001).
[30] Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., and Ockenfels, A. Cooperation among
strangers with limited information about reputation. J. Public
Econ. 89, 1457–1468 (2005).
[31] Seinen, I. and Schram, A. Social status and group norms: In-
direct reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment. Eur. Econ.
Rev. 50, 581–602 (2006).
[32] Engelmann, D. and Steiner, J. Indirect reciprocity and strategic
reputation building in an experimental helping game. Games
Econ. Behav. 67, 399–407 (2009).
[33] Nowak, M. A. and Sigmund, K. The dynamics of indirect reci-
procity. J. Theor. Biol. 191, 561–574 (1998).
[34] Panchanathan, K. and Boyd, R. A tale of two defectors: the
importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity. J.
Theor. Biol. 224, 115–126 (2003).
[35] Perc, M., Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Szolnoki, A., and Florı´a and Y.
Moreno, L. M. Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions
on structured populations: a review. J. R. Soc. Interface 10,
20120997 (2013).
[36] Sigmund, K. Punish or perish? retailation and collaboration
among humans. Trends Ecol. Evol. 22, 593–600 (2007).
[37] Rand, D. G. The promise of mechanical turk: how online labor
markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. J. Theor.
Biol. 299, 172–179 (2012).
[38] Rand, D. G., Nowak, M. A., Fowler, J. H., and Christakis, N. A.
Static network structure can stabilize human cooperation. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 111, 17093–17098 (2014).
[39] Binder, K. and Hermann, D. K. Monte Carlo Simulations in
Statistical Physics. Springer, Heidelberg, (1988).
[40] Szabo´, G. and Fa´th, G. Evolutionary games on graphs. Phys.
Rep. 446, 97–216 (2007).
